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sory; the corporation being compelled to buy only if it has a surplus, a fund which it controls. That in turn led to the conclusion
that the contract was a nullity lacking mutuality of obligation. However, assuming that which many doubt, s.e., that mutuality is essential, this promise is no more illusory than many analogous promises
which serve as consideration. We have for example infants' promises, promises within the statute of frauds, promises of the government, promises to meet requirements, and promises to buy output.
All such promises bind the promisee although the~promisor may have
an option not to perform and yet escape liability Although specific
performance was properly demed in the Topken case for a lack of
equity on the plaintiff's side it becomes important to determine the
soundness of the dicta as the case of GreaterNew York CarpetHouse
v Herschnann is viewed. The holding in this case is also correct,
but the dicta in the Topken case is affirmed by the Appellate Division
and an incorrect inference of consideration is drawn so that the correct result is reached nevertheless. As matters stand there are two
correct decisions based on two doubtful opinions.
LEO SALON.

THE PLEDGING OF BANK ASSETS TO SECURE DEPOSITS. INTRA OR

ULTRA VIRES?
The insolvent condition of many banks in the last decade has
served, more frequently, to bring to the attention of the courts a
transaction whereby a bank hypothecates its liquid assets to secure
a deposit. There is a contrariety of opinion as to whether such an
act is within the authority of a bank, due mainly to the difference
of economic views in applying statutes and formulating policies. It
remains to determine the particular instances when a bank may
pledge its assets to secure deposits and, in the absence of authority,
the effect of such ultra wres acts. Any discussion of the powers of
banks must of necessity be divided into separate treatments of national banks and state banks. In view of the problem involved, there
must be a further distinction made between public and private
deposits.
State Banks
In the absence of statute, expressly stating whether a bank has
the right to pledge its assets, it becomes a question of public policy
in the determination of the zntra or ultra wres quality of such act.'
I Hellawell v. Hempstead, 10 F Supp. 771 (S. D. N. Y. 1935), Luikart v.
Aurora, 125 Neb. 263, 249 N. W 590 (1933).
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If one maintains that there is nothing inherently wrong in a banking corporation's assets being pledged to secure a depositor, then the
act is ntura vires as being within the purview of the banking business.
This is the earlier and more authoritative view held by a majority of
the courts.2 If, on the other hand, it is felt that the rights of general depositors and stockholders are jeopardized by the hypothecation, then the act is ultra vtres. The later decisions of a minority of
the states adopt the latter.3
The majority has often sustained its decisions by an approach
which makes use of the sovereign's right to priority The king, by
his prerogative, was preferred in the payment of debts, 4 and the
state, as successor to the sovereign power, became endowed with such
right of priority 5 From this it was argued that the result can be
no more inimical to the interest of the depositor upon -the bank's
insolvency, if the state deposit is secured by a pledge of assets. Such
rule clearly is not an equitable one, but is based on grounds of expediency and public welfare.0 But this analogy fails where an at2 William v. Hall, 30 Ariz. 581, 249 Pac. 755 (1926), McFerson v. National
Surety Co., 72 Colo. 482, 212 Pac. 489 (1923), First American Bank and Trust
Co. v. Palm Beach, 96 Fla. 247, 117 So. 900 (1928), Interstate National Bank v.

Ferguson, 48 Kan. 732, 30 Pac. 237 (1892), Ward v. Johnson, 95 Ill. 215
(1880), Schormck v. Butler, 205 Ind. 304, 185 N. E. 111 (1933), Richards v.
Osceola Bank, 79 Iowa 707, 45 N. W 294 (1890), Citizen's State Bank v. First
National Bank, 98 Kan. 109, 157 Pac. 392 (1916), U. S. Fidelity and G. Co. v.
Bassfield, 148 Miss. 109, 114 So. 26 (1927), C6nsol. School Dist. v. Citizen's
Savings Bank, 223 Mo. App. 940,21 S.W (2d)- 781 (1929), Ainsworth v. Kruger,
80 Mont 468, 260 Pac. 1055 (1927), Melaven v. Hunker, 35 N. M. 408, 299 Pac.
1075 (1931), Page Trust Co. v. Rose, 192 N. C. 673, 135 S. E. 795 (1926),
Mays v. Board of Comm'rs, 164 Okla. 231, 23 P. (2d) 664 (1933), Ahl v.
Rhoads, 84 Pa. 319 (1877), Cameron v. Christy, 286 Pa. 405, 133 Atl. 551
(1926), Grigsby v. Peoples Bank, 158 Tenn. 182, 11 S. W (2d) 673 (1928).
3 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Rainwater, 173 Ark. 84, 291 S. W 1003 (1927),
Arkansas-Louisiana Highway Improvement Dist. v. Taylor, 177 Ark. 440,
6 S. W (2d) 533 (1928), Wood v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 216 Cal. 748,
17 P (2d) 128 (1932), Commercial Bank and Trust Co. v. Citizens Trust and
Guaranty Co., 153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W 160 (1916), Albers v. Continental Illinois
Bank and Trust Co., 296 Ill. App. 596, 17 N. E. (2d) 67 (1938), Farmer's and
Merchant's State Bank v. Consol. School Dist., 174 Minn. 286, 219 N. W 163
(1928), State Bank of Commerce v. Stone, 261 N. Y. 175, 184 N. E. 750
(1933), City of Mt. Vernon v. Mt. Vernon Trust Co., 245 App. Div. 748, 281
N. Y. Supp. 1008 (2d Dept. 1935), reV'd, 270 N. Y. 400, 1 N. E. (2d) 825
(1936), Divide County v. Baird, 55 N. D. 45, 212 N. W 236 (1927), Foster v.
Longview, 26 S. W (2d) 1059 (Tex. 1930), rev'g, 11 S. W (2d) 217 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928), Austin v. Lamar County, 11 S. W (2d) 553 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928), reVd, 26 S. W (2d) 1062 (Tex. 1930).
4 Giles v. Grover, 9 Bing. 128, 139 Eng.Rep. 563 (1832), In re Henley &
Co., L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 469, 39 L. T. (Ni. s.) 53 (1878).
sit re Carnegie Trust Co., 206 N. Y. 390, 99 N. E. 1096 (1912).
Contra:
Central Trust Co. v. Third Ave. Ry., 186 Fed. 291 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911), Smith
v. Arnold, 165 Ky. 214, 176 S. W 983 (1915), Shields v. Thomas, 71 Miss. 260,
42 Am. St. Rep. 458 (1893).
6"The right is therefore one that is adapted to the circumstances, conditions,
and necessities of the people because essential to sustain the public burdens and
discharge the public debts, and unless some provision of statute can be found
which clearly evinces a legislative intent to abandon or waive this preference
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tempt is made to extend it to political subdivisions of the state, for
the state's priority is not transferable3
Most often advanced, in favor of the pledging of assets,* is the
argument that a deposit is, as a hiatter -of law, a loan.8 A bank may
borrow mbney and pledge its assets to secure the loan. 9 Since a
deposit is legally a loan, and' a loan may be secured, then a bank
may lawfully hypothecate its assets to secure a deposit.10 Such reasoning is faulty A deposit and a loan are similar only in resultthey both give-rise to a debtoi dhd creditor relationship." A loan
is sought when the financial stability of the institution is, threatened
and is necessary for its preservation. Deposits, on the contrary, are
invited by a semblance of responsibility and sound structure and,
while necessary in the aggregate, do n6f separately, as an incident
of the banking. business, necessitate the pledging 6f property to which
general depositors look for their security 12 *In 'a case which dedared invalid pledges other than those expressly authorized by statute it was said. Is
Large deposits signify heaIth and large borrowings banking disease. Springing
from opposite causes, the two by their existence signify opposite conditionsdeposits the -normal and borrowings the abnormal. Moreover; the antithesis
holds to the end, for the witldrawal of a deposit is a, loss, whereas the payment
right of the state it is the duty of the courts to preserve rather than to defeat it."
U. S Fidelity-& Guaranty Co. v. -Bramwell, 108 -Ore. 261, 217 Pac. 332, 335
(1923)',
3 ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING (perm. ed.) 521..
"
7
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co, v. -Bramwell, 12 F (2d) 307 (D..Ore.
1926), In re -Northern 'Bank of New York, 212 N. Y 608, 106 N. E. 749
(1914).
81 MoRsE, BANKS AND BANKING (6th ed. 1928) 665; Note- (1932).41
YALE L. J. 1076.
9 Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131, 19 Sup. Ct. 360
(1899), Auten v.U. S. Nat. Bank of N. Y., 174 U. S. 125, 19. Sup. Ct. 628
(1899), Schumacher v. Eastern .Bank& Trust Co., 52.F (2d) .925 (C. C. A.
4th, 1931), Curtis v. Leavitt,,15 N. Y. 9 (1857)..
30 William v. Hall, 30 Ariz. 581, 249 Pac. .755 (1926), Page.,Trust Co. v.
Rose, 192 N. C. 673, -135 S.E. 795 (1926),; Gnigsby v. People's Bank, 158 Tenn.
182, 11 S. W (2d) 673 -(1928).
1 "A deposit was originally -a delivery of property .for gratuitous safekeeping, title to which remained in the depositor. The word is now used to
designate a certain type of loan, i.e., to a bank. * * *
"Though general deposits, whether on -time or demand or -evidenced by a
certificate of deposit, are sometimes referred to-as loans, they are neither loans
nor bailments, 'strictly' .speaking, but are transactions -peculiar in the banking
business, which the courts recognize: and, deal with according to commercial
usage and understandihg.
"The main purpose of a loan is investment. The main purpose of a deposit
is safe-keeping. A deposit clearly, is not a loan pure and simple." 3 ZOLLMAN,
BANKS AND BANKING (pera. -ed.) § 3154.
12 Texas and Pacific Ry. v¢.
Pottorff, 291 U. S. 245, 256 (fn: 8), 54 Sup.

Ct. 416 (1934) ("the pledge reduces the fund of quick assets available to meet
unusual demands without any assurance that the deposit will be used to replenish
this fund.").
'3Farmer's and Merchant's State Bank v. Consol. School Dist., 174 Minn.
286, 291, 219 N. W 163, 165 (1928).
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of a loan is a gain. Deposits continued and increased evidence banking success,
whereas borrowings continued and increased portend failure.
It is also urged that-the amount of the pledged-assets is replaced
by the deposit, 14 so that m any event the general depositors are deprived of nothing. It is more than probable, however, that the depositor will demand more security than the amount of the deposit.
While the bank may carefully watch the relation between the pledged
assets and the balance of the account, it.is very likely that the deposit may dwindle and the pledge allowed to remain static m the
hope that the depositor will replace the difference. The result is
that a substantial part of the bank's property is removed from lucrative commerce. More important is the fact that the depositor will.
take advantage of the pledge-only after the bank becomes insolvent.15
It is indeed difficult to deny that -when,the -bank ,isin sound, financial
condition, the pledge is faultless as of the time of the deposit. But
when, after the bank has become insolvent, the depositor demands
return of his deposit in full it is impractical to observe the transaction theoretically as oiie isolated in time.' 6
Although it would seem that the alleged identity between -a loan
and a deposit, which has persuaded some courts to uphold. a pledge, 17
should apply equally-as -well to private -deposits, the majority of the.
later decisions are to -the.effect that a bank -may not -pledge its -assets
to scure'private deposits.'8 The cases, -in which the analogy (betveen a loan and a deposit) supports the decision upholding the
pledge, involve public deposits and the courts were therefore con14

Page Trust Co. v. Rose, 192 N. C. 673, 135- S- E. 795 (1926).

-"

15 See note 12, supra.
16 Ibid. From an examination of the report in City of Mt. Vernon v. Mt.

Vernon Trust Co., 245 App. Div. 748, 281 N. Y. Supp. 1008 (2d Dept. 1935),
rezfd, 270 N. Y. 400, 1 N. E. (2d 825- (1936), one may become aware of the
inequity resulting from such transaction. There was a deposit of public funds
of something more than a million dollars. The defendant bank had pledged as
security $800,000 of its assets. After -the bank holiday the defendant reopened
and paid out 10% of the deposits. After reorganization defendant paid 55% of
the deposits. Thus plaintiff had received $650,000 of its deposit, leaving a
balance of $450,000 secured by assets to the value of $800,000. Plaintiff city
sold the pledged assets and credited the defendant with the proceeds of the sale.
"This action is now brought for the payment of $103,000 in cash, being the
approximate difference between the amount of the original deposit owed to the
city less the credit from the sale of the pledged securities, and the payment in
cash of ten per cent at the time of the restricted opening and fifty-five per cent
at the time of the unrestricted opening" (p. 406). It is evident that-the plaintiff
realized only $250,000 from the forced sale of the assets valued at $800,000, and
the bank is still liable for the balance.
127See note 10, supra.

IsWood v. Imperial Irigation Dist., 216 Cal. 748, 17 P (2d) 128 (1932),
People v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 11. 75, 197 N. E. 537 (1935), State Bank
of Commerce v. Stone, 261 N. Y. 175, 184 N. E. 750 (1933), Fulton v. Dean,
47 Ohio App. 558, 192 N. E. 278 (1934), (1927) 22 ILL. L. Rnv. 449; Note
(1931) 79 U. oF PA.'L. REV. 608, Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J: 1076; and see
generally cases cited in note 3, supra.
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cered with the protection of public funds. 19 An eminent authority
on banks and banking states that, because a bank has the power to
give security for public deposits or for a loan, it does not mean that
a power exists to secure its private depositors "directly or indirectly, by estoppel or otherwise" 20
Most of the cases whether in support of one view or the other,
involve statutes which provide for the exaction of some type of security for various public funds.21 Such statutes help but little, for
they leave open the question of the validity of pledges not specifically
mentioned, and the judicial construction will be colored by public
policy 22 If the depositor is to be protected and such pledge is a
threat to his general security, then the bank must adhere to the letter
of the statute, 23 if such acts are not considered adverse to the best
interests of banking institutions, then such statute shows a legislative intent to secure all public moneys.2 4 In favor of pledging assets
for public deposits it is said 25
Securing public deposits is on a different plane than securing private deposits.
There is soliciting among banks to secure public deposits, and security follows
as a matter of course. The knowledge of this practice does not interfere with
the business of the bank. General depositors are not influenced by such knowledge. It is a distinction to a bank to be a public depository. Public funds are
added to the assets of the bank and are to the advantage of general depositors.
When a bank is sound it is good business judgment to pledge its collateral to
secure public funds instead of paying a surety company for bonds written for
the same purpose.

On the other hand it is contended that the power to pledge
"permits an unfair preference seriously prejudicial to the rights of
the mass of depositors whom the course of legislation has been conSee note 10, supra; Note (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1076.
20 5,ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING (perm. ed.) 271.
29

"If a bank had
power to pledge its assets to secure the deposit of one private depositor without
the knowledge of its other depositors, the mere possibility of the exercise of
this favoritism and preferences would breed distrust m depositors and lessen,
their number." (276).
21 Representative are those enacted by the New York Legislature. STATE
FINANCE LAW § 105 (N. Y. Laws 1940, c. 593), COUNTY LAW § 45 (Amend.
L. 1938, c. 655, § 1), N. Y. CITY CHARTER § 421 (N. Y. Laws, 1934, c. 867).
These impose upon the named officer the duty of exacting, of the selected
depositary, a surety bond or in lieu thereof certain designated securities. With
respect to the city charters enacted by the legislature, there is dicta in New
Rochelle Trust Co. v. Whte, 283 N. Y. 223, 28 N. E. (2d) 387 (1940), to the
effect that they are sufficient authorization for state banks to pledge assets to
secure public funds of such cities.
22 See note 1, supra.
23 Rider v. State, 170 Okla. 630, 41 P (2d) 484 (1935), State Bank of
Commerce v. Stone, 261 N. Y. 175, 184 N. E. 750 (1933), Comm. Bank and
Trust Co. v. Citizen's Trust and Guaranty Co., 153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W 160
(1916), Divide County v. Baird, 55 N. D. 45, 212 N. W 236 (1927).
24 Temple v. McKay, 172 S. C. 305, 174 S. E. 23 (1934).
25 5 ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANNING (perm. ed.) 265.
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sistently designed to protect." 26 Then too, the bank invites the public to deposit moneys upon a misrepresentation of its financial condition, its published periodical statements contain no mention of
these secret withdrawals of its assets. 27 In Commercal Bank and
Trust Co. v. Citizens Trust and Guaranty Co. the court decided
that it would be against public policy to imply from statute, authorizing the pledge of assets to secure certain public funds, the
general power to so pledge. The prime motive was to prevent the
infliction of financial loss upon depositors and stockholders, insofar
as such practice, in case of insolvency,8 would enable the bank to favor
the few at the expense of the many 2
In New York whatever doubt there may have been, as to the
moneys,
authority of banks to pledge their assets to secure public
has been removed by a declaration of legislative intent.29 This intent has been construed as recognizing that a bank has not the authority to pledge its assets to secure deposits of any kind, public or
private, which are not expressly provided for in the statutes.30 In
New Rochelle Trust Co. v. White,31 the question was whether a
local city law, requiring a city officer to exact security from a depositary of city funds, bestowed authority on a bank to give such
security The Court of Appeals answered the question in the negative and, citing State Bank of Commerce v Stone, reiterated what
it had there said-in the absence of statutory authority a bank may
not pledge its assets to secure a deposit; the statutes empower the
banks to hypothecate their securities for deposits of public moneys
only in some cases.
The United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion
in City of Yonkers v Downey,32 decided before the New Rochelle
Trust Co. case, but citing State Bank of Commerce v Stone 33 and
City of Mt. Vernon v Mt. Vernon Trust Co.,3 4 relied on by the
Court of Appeals. In the Yonkers case the district court denied the
26 Note (1931) 79 U. oF PA. L. Rrv. 608, Note (1934) 6 ROCKY MT. L.
REv. 246.
27 State Bank of Commerce v. Stone, 261 N. Y. 175, 184 N. E. 750 (1933).
28 153 Ky. 566, 156 S. W 160 (1913), followed in City of Louisville v.
Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co., 54 S.W (2d) 40 (Ky. 1932).
29 State Bank of Commerce v. Stone, 261 N. Y. 175, 184 N. E. 750 (1933),
see note
21, supra.
30
Downey v. City of Yonkers, 23 F Supp. 1018 (S.D. N. Y. 1938), aff'd,
106 F (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), certiorartgranted sub niom City of Yonkers
v. Downey, 308 U. S.547, 60 Sup. Ct. 298 (1940), affd, 309 U. S.590, 60 Sup.
Ct 796 (1940), New Rochelle Trust Co. v. White, 283 N. Y. 223, 28 N. E.
(2d) 387 (1940). But see Hellawell v. Town of Hemvstead, 10 F Supp. 771
252 N. Y. Supp. 68
(E. D. N. Y. 1935), Matter of Broderick, 140 Misc. 8-61,
(1931), Matter of Bank of Spencerport, 143 Misc. 196, 255 N. Y. Supp. 482
(1932).
31283 N. Y. 223, 28 N. E. (2d) 387 (1940), rev'g, 258 App. Div. 400, 17
N. Y. S. (2d) 375 (3d Dept. 1940).
32 309 U. S 590 60 Sup. Ct. 796 (1940).
3261 i. . N17,184 N. E. 750 (1933).
34 270 N. Y. 400, 1 N. E. (2d) 825 (1936).
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contention of the defendant city that the power, of state banks to
pledge its assets to secure. public moneys is established by practice,
public policy, court decisions and statutes. It found that the statutes deny rather than affirm the existence of public policy in favor
of the general right to make such pledge.85 I-ellawell v Town of
Hempstead, Matter of Broderick and Matter of Bank of Spencerport " were cited as holding that New York's public policy authorized banks to pledge assets to secure public deposits, but it was said
that such decisions must give way to a decision of the Court of7 Appeals which had spoken in State Bank of Commerce v Stone.8
Thus the expressions of the Court of Appeals and the United
States Supreme Court are to the effect that a bank does -not have the
authority to hypothecate its assets to secure a depositor, the exception being specific authorization by statute which is strictly construed.
National Banks
In contradistinction to state banks, national banks are not subject to the sovereignty of the state,3 8 and all their powers must be
gleaned from federal statutes.8 9 The Banking Act of 1864 40 authorized the giving of security for federal funds deposited by the Secretary of the Treasury But nowhere in the statute could be found
mention of the pledging of assets to secure deposits. The Act and
all of the amendments to it, prior to 1930, specifically designated the
4
funds for which the public officer must demand a pledge of assets. '
It was the duty imposed upon the officer which authorized the bank
to make the pledge. 42 Plainly then, there was no statutory author-ity for the banks to pledge security to a private depositor, and the
United States Supreme Court has consistently refused 8to recognize
such power based bn anything but statutory authority 4
35 Downey v. City of Yonkers, 23 F Supp. 1018 (S.D. N. Y. 1938). "As
was said by the Attorney General of the State of New York in opinion under
date of June 15, 1933, in referring to these various provisions: 'It will be noted
that all of the provisions thus far herein cited concern themselves with public
moneys * * * this might lead to the conclusion that in the absence of a special
act therefor banks may not give security for deposits made by public officers
and agents.'" (1021).
36 See note 30, mupra.
37 See note 29, supra.
38 Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U. S.275, 16 Sup. Ct. 506 (1896).
39 Cook County Nat. Bank v. United States, 107 U. S.445, 2 Sup. Ct. 561
(1882), California Bank v. Kennedy, 167 U. S.362, 17 Sup. Ct. 831 (1897),
First Nat. Bank v. Missouri, 263 U. S.640, 44 Sup. Ct. 213 (1934), Faircloth
v. Atlantic City, 16"F Supp. 705 (D.N. J.1936).
40 13 STAT. 101, 12 U. S. C. A. § 90 (1864).
41
Texas and Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U. S. 245, 257, 54 Sup. Ct. 416
(1933).
42 O'Connor v. Rhodes, 65 App. D. C. 21, 79 F (2d) 146 (1935), aff'd, 297
U. S.383, 56 Sup. Ct. 517 (1936).
43 Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U. S.245, 54 Sup. Ct. 416 (1933),
City of Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U. S.262, 54 Sup. Ct. 421 (1933).
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assets
Prior to 1930 a national bank could not legally pledge its
44
Not
to secure deposits by a state or a political subdivision thereof.
until 1930 did the general expression "public money" enter into the
Act. 4r Then it was confined to monies, of a state or political subdivision -thereof. The purpose of the amendment was to equalize
opportunities between state and national banks in the same state.46
The latter could now pledge assets to secure deposits of state-monies
where the state, bank was so "auihorized by the, law of -the state".
The enactment incorporates the law of the state, as found in the
statutes and decisions of the highest state court. In City of Marton
v. Sneeden,47 the Supreme Court reiterated its opimon that the National Banking Act-did not confer the power to pledge assets to secure any public deposits but those made by the Secretary of the
Treasury and specific federal funds, and decided the controlling question whether Illinois had authorized its state banks to pledge assets
to secure public deposits of its political subdivision. The Court
found that neither by the common law, as found in the decisions of
the highest court of Illinois, nor by statutes, 48 which were similar to
New York laws on the subject, were state banks authorized to
pledge assets to secure public moneys of a city It follows then, by
virtue of the 1930 Enabling Act, that the national banks' pledge was
ultra vires.
The cases involving national banks* have definitely indicated' a
trend toward the restriction of the power of banks to. the statutory.
grant. 49 Where the interest of the public, as expressed by statute,,
does not demand that public funds be secured, the interest of the
general depositor will be supreme.5 0 In this connection one must examine the" decision in Inland Waterways Corp. v Young.51 This
case deals with the power of a national bank to pledge its assets to
secure a deposit of federal moneys by corporations created and controlled by the government; and while it does not involve public
funds of a state, it does evidence a change of the judicial approach in
the determination-of the powers of national banks. In.line with pre44

Capital Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Olympia Nat. Bank, 80 F

(2d) 561

(C. C. A. 9th, 1935)'.

45 "Any association may upon the deposit with it' of, public money of a-

state or any political subdivision thereof, give security for the safe-keeping and
prompt payment of the mongy so deposited, of the same kind as is authorized by
the law of the state in which such -association is located in the case of other
banking institutions in the state." 46 STAT. 809, 12 U. S. C. A. § 90 (1930).
48 Lewis v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 292 U. S. 559, 564, 54 Sup. Ct. 848

(1934).

47291 U. S. 262, 54 Sup. Ct. 421 (1933).
48 CAHiXi's 1931 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 130, par. 29; CAHILL'S 1931 ILL. REv.

16a, par. 11.
Texas and Pac. Ry. v. Pottorff, 291 U. S.245, 54 Sup. Ct. 416 (1933),
City of Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U. S.262, 54 Sup. Ct. 421 (1933).
STAT.
49 c.

50 Ibid.

,1Inland Waterways Corp. v.,Young, 309 U. S. 517, 60 Sup. Ct. 646 (1940),

rev'g, Inland Waterways v. Hardee, 69 App. D. C. 280, 100 F (2d) 678 (1938).
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vious decisions, O'Connor v Rhodes,52 decided in 1935, held that a
national bank could not pledge its assets to secure deposits by the
United States Alien Property Custodian and deposits by the United
States Shipping Board M. M. Fleet. In the Inland Waterways case
it was said that the statutes commanding the Secretary of the Treasury to exact security for "public money" deposited by him in national banks is an exaction of duty from the secretary as to moneys
subject to his control and is not a limitation upon the power of the
bank to give security when it may be required by other government
officers and agencies charged with custody of federal funds. Although the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, claimed the basis of its decision to be the holdings in Texas
Ry. v Pottorff and City of Mar-ton v Sneeden, it said that the
National Banking Act cannot be strictly construed but must be read,
in conjunction with its history, as a manifestation of national practice and..given. scope consonant with. the reason for its development.
This was strongly condemned in the dissenting opinon 53 which maintained that the powers of a national bank were only those conferred
by the language of the Act as held in the two cases mentioned above.
The Court said. 11
What may be inimical to the private aspects of the national banking system, and
therefore ultra z'res, has no such relevance to the public aspect of national
banks, and to the enforcement of the public interest by those charged with
primary responsibility for its guardianship. * * * But when legality itself is m
dispute-when Congress has spoken at best with ambiguous silence-a long continued practice pursued with the knowledge of the Comptroller of the Currency
is more persuasive than considerations of abstract conflict between such a practice and purposes attributed to Congress.
This would indicate that what seems to be a radical departure from
the trend of federal decisions, with respect to the power of national
banks to pledge their assets, is merely a change in the method of
determining what the public interest is. It is doubtful whether this
case will affect the trend of state and federal court decisions relative
to the pledge of assets to secure state public funds. The decision
appears to be another manifestation of the "new Court's" attempt to
remove the restraints imposed by the "old Court" upon the activities
of the legislative and executive branches of the government. 55

52 65 App. D. C. 21, 79 F (2d) 146 (1935), aff'd, 297 U. S. 383, 56 Sup.
Ct. 517 (1936).
53
Per Roberts, J., Holmes, C. J., and McReynolds, J., concurring. Reed
and Murphy, JJ. took no part.
54309 U. S. 517, 523, 60 Sup. Ct. 646 (1940).
55 Wolfe, The Supreme Court-Then and Now (1941) 15 ST. JOHN's L.
REv. 188, 190.
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The Ultra Vires Pledge
The City of Yonkers case, supra, which involved a New York
national bank, posed an additional problem raised by the decisions in
the New York courts. The court found that, whereas New York
State banks have not the legal authority to pledge their assets to
secure all deposits, the Court of Appeals recognizes a power to do
so insofar as the exercise of such ultra vtres power may create an
estoppel not only against the corporation, but also against its general
creditors.5 6 In line with the general law of ultra znres contracts the
Court has consistently held that before the bank may repossess its
assets it must return what it has received in the transaction.5 7 The
United States Supreme Court and the courts of several states, on
the other hand, hold that the bank is not estopped from recovering
its pledged assets, it need return only the pro rata share to which
a general depositor is entitled.58 Although the federal courts also
maintain that one is estopped from retaining benefits derived under
an ultra vnres contract, 59 they distinguish the type of contract under
discussion and make an exception of it. The rationale is that such
a contract is against public policy and void; the law will not permit
to be done indirectly that which cannot be done directly; the doctrine
of estoppel should not be permitted to circumvent the public policy
of the nation.60 In Texas & Pacific Ry. v Pottorff 61 it was contended that, although the bank's agreement should be held to be
ultra vzres, estoppel would prevent its saying so. The circuit court
pointed out that the suit was not upon benefits received by the bank,
but on the contract, in which case the corporation could not be
bound upon an illegal contract. Such holding seems to dodge the
issue and what was said above is more reliable.
Because of the different effects attributed to the ultra rires
pledge in the New York and federal courts, it was argued in the
Yonkers case that the bank had the power to pledge, since under
the Enabling Act it might do what the state banks could do. This
argument was rejected on the ground that a national bank could do
only what the state bank was "authorized" to do. The fact that the
state bank had the "power" to secure a deposit did not mean that
its conduct was authorized by law. The plaintiff city also argued
that, pursuant to the decision in Erw Ry. v Tompkins,62 to the effect
56 Yonkers v. Downey, 106 F (2d) 69 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
57 Appleton v. Citizen's Central Nat Bank, 190 N. Y. 417, 83 N. E. 470

(1908),

see generally PRAsHFR, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
(1937) c. VI.
Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262, 54 Sup. Ct. 421 (1933), Wood v.
Imperial Irrigation Dist., 216 Cal. 748, 17 P (2d) 128 (1932), People v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75, 197 N. E. 537 (1935).
59 See note 51, supra.
60 Smith v. Baltimore and 0. R. R., 56 F (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932).
PRIVATE
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58

6163 (F

(2d) 1 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).

62 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938).
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that there is no federal cotnmon ,law; the federal courts must apply
the common law of New York. This was denied by the district
court which .said. that the Enabling Act.-provided -for the mncorporatibn.:of state law 'only in the-determmatibn -of the validity-.of the
pledge. As to the effect-of -an ultra irea pledge, -the,regulatioi of
the conduct .of national banks is peculiarly m:,the power of' the
Federal Government;. the matter being governed by federal statute,
the decision in the Erie,case:has no effect.
Conclusion
The earlier cases on the'subject '"vhlch' have held' that a bank
may hy~othecate its assets .to. secure a deposit of, public ftds were
so .decded .prinarily because of a'desire to protect the p'lic. ,To
do so the' coui'ts. ~iasoned'to their conclusion from the ttheory of a
sovereign's priority .- the" payment of debts, from. the fact that,.'an.
accepted authority on te subject of banking had stated.,a deposit
to hie m, legaf effect:a loan 68 and by.,cting as authority cases 64
which were decided on. a dissimilar set of -facts but which, by vay
of.-dicta, iight sulstantiate the desired proposition. -Such. case: is
Ward v Johnson,65 .decided in. 1880, whichi upheld the pledge, because the transaction appears .to have 'been.a loan rather than a deposit. But the case has never beei" referre l :'to -in any. Illinois -court.
decision nor hasthere been any'manifestation in an Illinois..case.,of.
an exercise.opf such power on:;the part ofa state bank.6 6 In. People.
v Wiersenu StAite' Bank 7 decided in 1935, the Illhnois, 'Supreme:
Court. held invalid, a pledge of assets to secure the deposit io. a poitical subdivision of the' state. because the state statutes d .d iiot au7,
thorize, such a pledge. While the early cases uphplding fthe ptogmg
of bank issets are still relied upon the tendency of the. later decisions,
is to adopt the view that in the ,absence of statutory aufhonty; the
banks have no.such power. As has:heen "pomted..6ot the,.practce is,
quite prevalent with respect to public funds,' but.'only bS.(au.5e.they,
are expressly provided for by the statutei, of the several'-.states.
Examples of a change of attitude are. the ,decisions. of the courts,. of,
Arizona ajid Texas,6 8 which .formqrly appro.ve ,;such pledge ;butolonger do so. Of supreme consideraion is ,the interest of,the public.
not so much in the security 6f public iioieys as in the welfare dfiet
banks and in the protection of the equali{y of.the iights of those de'
"
ORSE,,BANXS AND BANXIXG (6th ed. -1928) 665.
Ward v. Johnson, 95 I1. 215 (1880), Ahl v. Rhoads, 84.Pa. 319 (1877),
•65 95 Ili. 215 (1880).
66 See Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U. S. 262, 54' Sup. Ct. 421- (1933).
"
67 361 111. 75, 197 N. E. 537 -(1935).
68 Button v. Sangumnetti, 40 Ariz. 329, 11 P (2d). 1085 (1932) - Foster v.
Longview, 11 S. W' (.2d) 217 (Tex. Cir. App. 1928), re7d, 26 S. W (2d)
1059 (Tex. 1930), Austin v. Lamar County, 11' S. W. (2d) 553 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928), rev'd, 26 S. W (2d) 1062 (Tex. 1930).
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.ing with them.69 . The. common design has been. to insure, in case of
disaster, uniformity in the treatment of depositors -.and, a. ratable
'distribution of the assets.70
BERNARD SCHIFF.

LIABIILITY OF HOSPITALS FOR THE NEGLIGENCE OF THEIR
EMPLOYEES

The cases on the subject of charitable hospital liability "present
an almost hopelessly tangled mass of reason such as is not often
encountered in the law.... The question is one which the courts have
been fertile in drawing subtle distinctions, many of them irrelevant to
,the point for discussion, or, at least, leading to no principle by which
the conclusions reached can be reconciled." I An abundance of opinion reveals a marked dissatisfaction with the status of the law today,
and evidences a positive desire that hospital liability conform to the
changing mores of the times. For the purposes of this article, the
subject of liability will be approached from the various agencies purporting to claim exemptions from tort liability. 'A discussion of the
damage liability of charitable, state and municipal hospitals will be had
in order.
Charitable Hospitals
One of the earliest cases in this country deciding that a charitable
hospital is exempt from tort liability to a patient is that of McDonald
v. Massachusetts General Hospital.2 - In the formation of the immunity rule, this case has been frequently cited and approved.3 In turn,
the only authority relied upon in that case was a decision of an English
court.4 That this 'case was shortly overruled and the subsequent
status of the American decisions impaired is evidenced by the statement of Kennedy, L.J., "With the American ...

cases ...

I do not

think it necessary to deal. They are not in agreement; in one of them
[citing the McDonald case] the judgment appears to have been influenced by an English decision of Holliday v. St. Leonard, supra, which
has been overruled by the House of Lords in Mersey Docks v.
Gibbs."
69 People v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75, 197 N. E. 537 (1935).
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1 Zollman, Damage Liability of CharitableInstitutions (1921) 19 Mica. L.
70

Rnv. 395, 408.
2 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
3 Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915) ; L.
A. (1915D).
4 Holliday v. St Leonard, 11 C. B. (N. s.) 192 (1861).
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